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CONSERVATIVE AND DISSIPATIVE POLYMATRIX
REPLICATORS
HASSAN NAJAFI ALISHAH, PEDRO DUARTE, AND TELMO PEIXE
Abstract. In this paper we address a class of replicator dynam-
ics, referred as polymatrix replicators, that contains well known
classes of evolutionary game dynamics, such as the symmetric and
asymmetric (or bimatrix) replicator equations, and some replica-
tor equations for n-person games. Polymatrix replicators form a
simple class of algebraic o.d.e.’s on prisms (products of simplexes),
which describe the evolution of strategical behaviours within a po-
pulation stratified in n ≥ 1 social groups.
In the 80’s Raymond Redheffer et al. developed a theory on
the class of stably dissipative Lotka-Volterra systems. This theory
is built around a reduction algorithm that “infers” the localization
of the system’ s attractor in some affine subspace. It was later
proven that the dynamics on the attractor of such systems is always
embeddable in a Hamiltonian Lotka-Volterra system.
In this paper we extend these results to polymatrix replicators.
1. Introduction
Lotka-Volterra (LV) systems were introduced independently by Al-
fred Lotka [31] and Vito Volterra [50] to model the evolution of biologi-
cal and chemical ecosystems. The phase space of a Lotka-Volterra sys-
tem is the non-compact polytope Rn+ = {x ∈ Rn : xi ≥ 0, i = 1, . . . , n},
where a point in Rn represents a state of the ecosystem. The LV sys-
tems are defined by the following o.d.e.
dxi
dt
= xi fi(x), i = 1, . . . , n,
where usually the so called fitness functions fi(x) are considered to be
affine, i.e., of the form
fi(x) = ri +
n∑
j=1
aij xj,
where A = (aij) ∈ Matn×n(R) is called the system’s interaction matrix.
In general, the dynamics of LV systems can be arbitrarily rich, as was
first observed by S. Smale [46] who proved that any finite dimensional
compact flow can be embedded in a LV system with non linear fitness
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functions. Later, using a class of embeddings studied by L. Brenig [5],
B. Hernández-Bermejo and V. Fairén [15], it was proven (see [15, The-
orems 1 and 2]) that any LV system with polynomial fitness functions
can be embedded in a LV system with affine fitness functions. Com-
bining this with Smale’s result, we infer that any finite dimensional
compact flow can be, up to a small perturbation, embedded in a LV
system with affine fitness functions. These facts emphasize the diffi-
culty of studying the general dynamics of LV systems.
In spite of these difficulties, many dynamical consequences have been
driven from information on the fitness data fi(x) for some special
classes of LV systems. Two such classes are the cooperative and compet-
itive LV systems, corresponding to fitness functions satisfying ∂fi
∂xj
≥ 0
and ∂fi
∂xj
≤ 0, respectively, for all i, j. Curiously, the fact that Smale’s
embedding takes place in a competitive LV system influenced the de-
velopment of the theory of cooperative and competitive LV systems
initiated by M. Hirsch [18–20].
In his pioneering work Volterra [50] studies dissipative LV systems as
generalizations of the classical predator-prey model. A LV system with
interaction matrix A = (aij) is called dissipative, resp. conservative,
if there are constants di > 0 such that the quadratic form Q(x) =∑n
i,j=1 aijdjxixj is negative semi-definite, resp. zero. Note that the
meaning of the term dissipative is not strict because dissipative LV
o.d.e.s include conservative LV systems. In addition we remark that
conservative LV models are in some sense Hamiltonian systems, a fact
that was well known and explored by Volterra.
Given a LV system with interaction matrix A = (aij), we define
its interaction graph G(A) to be the undirected graph with vertex set
V = {1, . . . , n} that includes an edge connecting i to j whenever aij 6= 0
or aji 6= 0. The LV system and its matrix A are called stably dissipative
if
∑n
i,j=1 a˜ijxixj ≤ 0 for all x ∈ Rn and every small enough perturba-
tion A˜ = (a˜ij) of A such that G(A˜) = G(A). This notion of stably
dissipativeness is due to Redheffer et al. whom in a series of papers
[36–40] studied this class of models under the name of stably admissible
systems.
Assuming the system admits an interior equilibrium q ∈ int(Rn+),
Redheffer et al. describe a simple reduction algorithm, running on the
graph G(A), that ‘deduces’ the minimal affine subspace of the form
∩i∈I{x ∈ Rn+ : xi = qi} that contains the attractor of every stably
dissipative LV system with interaction graph G(A).
Under the scope of this theory, Oliva et al. [11] have proven that the
dynamics on the attractor of a stably dissipative LV system is always
described by a conservative (Hamiltonian) LV system.
The replicator equation, which is now central to Evolutionary Game
Theory (EGT), was introduced by P. Taylor and L. Jonker [48]. It
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models the time evolution of the probability distribution of strategical
behaviors within a biological population. Given a payoff matrix A ∈
Matn×n(R), the replicator equation refers to the following o.d.e.
x′i = xi
(
(Ax)i − xtAx
)
, i = 1, . . . , n
on the simplex ∆n−1 = {x ∈ Rn+ :
∑n
j=1 xj = 1}. This equation says
that the logarithmic growth of the usage frequency of each behavioural
strategy is directly proportional to how well that strategy fares within
the population.
Another important class of models in EGT, that includes the Bat-
tle of sexes, is the bimatrix replicator equation. In this model the
population is divided in two groups, e.g. males and females, and all
interactions involve individuals of different groups. Given two payoff
matrices A ∈ Matn×m(R) and B ∈ Matm×n(R), for the strategies in
each group, the bimatrix replicator refers to the o.d.e.{
x′i = xi ((Ay)i − xtAy) i = 1, . . . , n
y′j = yj ((Bx)j − ytB x) j = 1, . . . ,m
on the product of simplices ∆n−1 × ∆m−1. It describes the time evo-
lution of the strategy usage frequencies in each group. These systems
were first studied in [43] and [44].
We now introduce the polymatrix replicator equation studied in [3].
Consider a population is divided in p ∈ N groups, α = 1, . . . , p, each
with nα ∈ N behavioral strategies, in a total of n =
∑p
α=1 nα strategies,
numbered from 1 to n. The system is described by a single payoff
matrix A ∈ Matn×n(R), which can be decomposed in p2 blocks Aα,β ∈
Matnα×nβ(R) with the payoffs corresponding to interactions between
strategies in group α with strategies in group β. Let us abusively write
i ∈ α to express that i is a strategy of the group α. With this notation
the polymatrix replicator refers to the following o.d.e.
x′i = xi
(
(Ax)i −
∑
j∈α
xj (Ax)j
)
, i ∈ α, α ∈ {1, . . . , p}.
on the product of simplexes ∆n1−1 × . . . × ∆np−1. Notice that inter-
actions between individuals of any two groups (including the same)
are allowed. Notice also that this equation implies that competition
takes place inside the groups, i.e., the relative success of each strategy
is evaluated within the corresponding group.
This class of evolutionary systems includes both the replicator equa-
tion (when p = 1) and the bimatrix replicator equation (when p = 2
and A1,1 = 0 = A2,2). It also includes the replicator equation for
n-person games (when Aα,α = 0 for all α = 1, . . . , p). This last sub-
class of polymatrix replicator equations specializes more general repli-
cator equations for n-person games with multi-linear payoffs that were
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first formulated by Palm [33] and studied by Ritzberger, Weibull [41],
Plank [34] among others.
In this paper we define the class of admissible polymatrix replicators
(the analogue of stably dissipative for LV systems), and introduce a
reduction algorithm similar to the one of Redheffer that ‘deduces’ the
constraints on the localization of the attractor. We also generalize the
mentioned theorem in [11] to polymatrix replicator systems.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we introduce the
notion of polymatrix game as well as its associated polymatrix repli-
cator system (o.d.e.), proving some elementary facts about this class
of models. In Section 3 we recall some known results of Redheffer et
al. reduction theory for stably dissipative LV systems. In sections 4
and 5, we define, respectively, the classes of conservative and dissipa-
tive polymatrix replicators, and study their properties. In particular,
we extend to polymatrix replicators the concept of stably dissipative-
ness of Redheffer et al.. We generalize to this context the mentioned
theorem in [11] about the Hamiltonian nature of the limit dynamics
of a “stably dissipative” system. Finally, in Section 6 we illustrate our
results with a simple example.
2. Polymatrix Replicators
Definition 2.1. A polymatrix game is an ordered pair (n,A) where
n = (n1, . . . , np) is a list of positive integers, called the game type, and
A ∈ Matn×n(R) a square matrix of dimension n = n1 + . . .+ np.
This formal definition has the following interpretation.
Consider a population divided in p groups, labeled by an integer α
ranging from 1 to p. Individuals of each group α = 1, . . . , p have exactly
nα strategies to interact with other members of the population. The
strategies of a group α are labeled by positive integers j in the range
n1 + . . .+ nα−1 < j ≤ n1 + . . .+ nα .
We will write j ∈ α to mean that j is a strategy of the group α. Hence
the strategies of all groups are labeled by the integers j = 1, . . . , n.
The matrix A is the payoff matrix. Given strategies i ∈ α and j ∈ β,
in the groups α and β respectively, the entry aij represents an average
payoff for an individual using the first strategy in some interaction
with an individual using the second. Thus, the payoff matrix A can be
decomposed into nα × nβ block matrices Aα,β, with entries aij, i ∈ α
and j ∈ β, where α and β range from 1 to p.
Definition 2.2. Two polymatrix games (n,A) and (n,B) with the
same type are said to be equivalent, and we write (n,A) ∼ (n,B),
when for α, β = 1, . . . , p, all the rows of the block matrix Aαβ − Bαβ
are equal.
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The state of the population is described by a point x = (xα)α in the
prism
Γn := ∆
n1−1 × . . .×∆np−1 ⊂ Rn ,
where ∆nα−1 = {x ∈ Rnα :
nα∑
i=1
xi = 1}, xα = (xj)j∈α and the entry xj
represents the usage frequency of strategy j within the group α. The
prism Γn is a (n−p)-dimensional simple polytope whose affine support
is the (n− p)-dimensional space En−p ⊂ Rn defined by the p equations∑
i∈α
xi = 1, 1 ≤ α ≤ p .
Definition 2.3. A polymatrix game (n,A) determines the following
o.d.e. on the prism Γn
dxi
dt
= xi
(
(Ax)i −
p∑
β=1
(xα)TAα,βxβ
)
, ∀ i ∈ α, 1 ≤ α ≤ p , (2.1)
called a polymatrix replicator system.
This equation says that the logarithmic growth rate of each frequency
xi is the difference between its payoff (Ax)i =
∑n
j=1 aijxj and the
average payoff of all strategies in the group α. The flow φtn,A of this
equation leaves the prism Γn invariant. Hence, by compactness of Γn,
this flow is complete. The underlying vector field on Γn will be denoted
by XA,n.
In the case p = 1, we have Γn = ∆n−1 and (2.1) is the usual
replicator equation associated to the payoff matrix A.
When p = 2, and A11 = A22 = 0, Γn = ∆n1−1×∆n2−1 and (2.1) be-
comes the bimatrix replicator equation associated to the pair of payoff
matrices (A12, A21).
The polytope Γn is parallel to the affine subspace
Hn :=
{
x ∈ Rn :
∑
j∈α
xj = 0, for α = 1, . . . , p
}
. (2.2)
For each α = 1, . . . , p, we denote by piα : Rn → Rn the projection
x 7→ y, yi :=
{
xi if i ∈ α
0 if i /∈ α .
We also define 1 := (1, . . . , 1) ∈ Rn .
Lemma 2.4. Given a matrix C ∈ Matn×n(R), the following statements
are equivalent:
(a) Cαβ has equal rows, for all α, β ∈ {1, . . . , p},
(b) Cx ∈ H⊥n , for all x ∈ Rn.
Moreover, if any of these conditions holds then Xn,C = 0 on Γn.
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Proof. Assume (a). Since H⊥n is spanned by the vectors piα(1) with
α = 1, . . . , p, we have v ∈ H⊥n iff vi = vj for all i, j ∈ α. Because
all rows of C in the group α are equal, we have (Cx)i = (Cx)j for all
i, j ∈ α. Hence item (b) follows.
Next assume (b). For all i ∈ α, with α ∈ {1, . . . , p}, Cei ∈ H⊥n ,
which implies that ci,k = cj,k for all j ∈ α. This proves (a).
If (a) holds, then for any α ∈ {1, . . . , p}, i, j ∈ α and k = 1, . . . , n, we
have cik = cjk. Hence for any x ∈ Γn, and i, j ∈ α with α ∈ {1, . . . , p},
(C x)i = (C x)j, which implies that Xn,C = 0 on Γn. 
Proposition 2.5. Given two polymatrix games (n,A) and (n,B) with
the same type n, if (n,A) ∼ (n,B) then Xn,A = Xn,B on Γn.
Proof. Follows from Lemma 2.4 and the linearity of the correspondence
A 7→ Xn,A. 
We have the following obvious characterization of interior equilibria.
Proposition 2.6. Given a polymatrix game (n,A), a point q ∈ int(Γn)
is an equilibrium of Xn,A if and only if (Aq)i = (Aq)j for all i, j ∈ α
and α = 1, . . . , p.
In particular the set of interior equilibria of Xn,A is the intersection
of some affine subspace with int(Γn).
3. Lotka-Volterra systems
The standard sector
Rn+ = {(x1, . . . , xn) ∈ Rn : xi ≥ 0, ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , n}}.
is the phase space of Lotka-Volterra systems.
Definition 3.1. We call Lotka-Volterra (LV) to any system of differ-
ential equations on Rn+ of the form
x′i = xi
(
ri +
n∑
j=1
aijxj
)
, i = 1, . . . , n . (3.1)
In the canonical interpretation (3.1) models the time evolution of
an ecosystem with n species. Each variable xi represents the density
of species i, the coefficient ri stands for the intrinsic rate of decay
or growth of species i, and each coefficient aij represents the effect
of population j over population i. For instance aij > 0 means that
population j benefits population i. The matrix A = (aij)1≤i,j≤n is
called the interaction matrix of system (3.1).
The interior equilibria of (3.1) are the solutions q ∈ Rn+ of the non-
homogeneous linear equation r + Ax = 0. Given A ∈ Matn×n(R) and
q ∈ Rn such that r + Aq = 0, the LV system (3.1) can be written as
dx
dt
= XA,q(x) := x ∗ A (x− q) , (3.2)
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where ∗ denotes the point-wise multiplication of vectors in Rn.
Definition 3.2. We say that the LV system (3.2), the matrix A, or the
vector field XA,q, is dissipative iff there is a positive diagonal matrix
D such that QAD(x) = xTADx ≤ 0 for every x ∈ Rn.
Proposition 3.3. If XA,q is dissipative then, for any D = diag(di) as
in Definition 3.2, XA,q admits the Lyapunov function
h(x) =
n∑
i=1
xi − qi log xi
di
, (3.3)
which decreases along orbits of XA,q.
Proof. The derivative of h along orbits of XA,q is given by
h˙(x) =
n∑
i,j=1
aij
di
(xi − qi)(xj − qj) = (x− q)TD−1A(x− q)
= [D−1(x− q)]TAD[D−1(x− q)] ≤ 0.

We will denote by Ker(A) the kernel of a matrix A.
Proposition 3.4. If A ∈ Matn×n(R) is dissipative and D is a positive
diagonal matrix such that QAD ≤ 0 then Ker(A) = DKer(AT ).
Proof. Assume first that QA ≤ 0 on Rn and consider the decomposition
A = M + N with M = (A + AT )/2 and N = (A − AT )/2. Clearly
Ker(M) ∩ Ker(N) ⊆ Ker(A). On the other hand, if v ∈ Ker(A) then
vT M v = vTAv = 0. BecauseQM = QA ≤ 0 this implies thatM v = 0,
i.e., v ∈ Ker(M). Finally, since N = A − M , v ∈ Ker(N). This
proves that Ker(A) = Ker(M) ∩ Ker(N). Similarly, one proves that
Ker(AT ) = Ker(M) ∩Ker(N). Thus Ker(A) = Ker(AT ).
In general, ifQAD ≤ 0, we have Ker((AD)T ) = Ker(DAT ) = Ker(AT ),
and Ker(AD) = D−1Ker(A). Thus, from the previous case applied to
AD we get D−1Ker(A) = Ker(AT ). 
Proposition 3.5. Any dissipative LV system admits an invariant fo-
liation on int(Rn+) with a unique equilibrium point in each leaf.
Proof. See [12, Proposition 2.1 and Theorem 2.3]. 
On the rest of this section we focus attention on LV systems with
interior equilbria q ∈ int(Rn+). In this case the Lyapunov function h is
proper, and hence the forward orbits of (3.2) are complete. Therefore,
the vector field XA,q induces a complete semi-flow φtA,q on int(Rn+).
Definition 3.6. Given a matrix A = (aij) ∈ Matn×n(R) of a LV sys-
tem, we define its associated graph G(A) to have vertex set {1, . . . , n},
and to contain an edge connecting vertex i to vertex j iff aij 6= 0 or
aji 6= 0.
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Given a matrix A = (aij) ∈ Matn×n(R) we call admissible perturba-
tion of A to any other matrix A˜ = (a˜ij) ∈ Matn×n(R) such that
a˜ij ≈ aij and a˜ij = 0 ⇔ aij = 0.
By definition, admissible perturbation are perturbations of A such that
G(A) = G(A˜).
Definition 3.7. A matrix A ∈ Matn×n(R) is said to be stably dissipa-
tive if any small enough admissible perturbation A˜ of A is dissipative,
i.e., if there exists ε > 0 such that for any admissible perturbation
A˜ = (a˜ij) of A = (aij),
max
1≤i,j≤n
|aij − a˜ij| < ε ⇒ A˜ is dissipative.
A LV system (3.2) is said to be stably dissipative if its interaction
matrix is stably dissipative.
Lemma 3.8. Let D be a positive diagonal matrix. If A is a stably
dissipative matrix, then AD and D−1A are also stably dissipative.
Proof. Since A is dissipative there exists a positive diagonal matrix D′
such that QAD′ ≤ 0 , which is equivalent to Q(AD)(D−1D′) ≤ 0 . Hence
AD is dissipative. Analogously, sinceQAD′ ≤ 0 we haveQD−1AD′D−1(x) =
QAD′(D
−1x) ≤ 0, which shows that D−1A is dissipative.
Let B be a small enough admissible perturbation of AD. Then there
exists an admissible perturbation A˜ of A such that B = A˜D. Since A is
stably dissipative the matrix A˜ is dissipative as well. Hence there exists
a positive diagonal matrix D′′ such that QA˜D′′ ≤ 0 , which is equiva-
lent to Q(A˜D)(D−1D′′) ≤ 0. This proves that B = A˜D is dissipative.
Therefore AD is stably dissipative.
A similar argument proves that D−1A is stably dissipative. 
Definition 3.9. Given a matrix A ∈ Matn×n(R) and a subset I ⊆
{1, . . . , n}, we say that AI = (aij)(i,j)∈I×I is the submatrix I × I of A.
Lemma 3.10. Let A ∈ Matn×n(R) be a stably dissipative matrix.
Then, for all I ⊆ {1, . . . , n}, the submatrix AI is stably dissipative.
Proof. Let I ⊂ {1, . . . , n} and consider an admissible perturbation B =
(bij)i,j∈I of AI . Define A˜ = (a˜ij) to be the matrix with entries
a˜ij =
{
bij if (i, j) ∈ I × I
aij if (i, j) /∈ I × I .
Clearly, A˜ is an admissible perturbation of A. Hence there exists a
positive diagonal matrix D such that A˜D ≤ 0. Letting now DI be the
I× I submatrix of D, we see that BDI = (A˜D)I ≤ 0, which concludes
the proof. 
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Definition 3.11. We call attractor of the LV system (3.2) to the fol-
lowing topological closure
ΛA,q := ∪x∈Rn+ω(x) ,
where ω(x) is the ω-limit of x by the semi-flow {φtA,q : Rn+ → Rn+}t≥0.
We need the following classical theorem (see [30, Theorem 2]).
Theorem 3.12 (La Salle). Given a vector field f(x) on a manifold M ,
consider the autonomous o.d.e. on M ,
x′ = f(x). (3.4)
Let h : M → R be a smooth function such that
(1) h is a Lyapunov function, i.e., the derivative of h along the flow
satisfies h˙(x) := Dhxf(x) ≤ 0 for all x ∈M .
(2) h is bounded from below.
(3) h is a proper function, i.e. {h ≤ a} is compact for all a ∈ R.
Then (3.4) induces a complete semi-flow onM such that the topological
closure of all its ω-limits is contained in the region where the derivative
of h along the flow vanishes, i.e.,
∪x∈Mω(x) ⊆ {x ∈M : h˙(x) = 0}.
The following lemma plays a key role in the theory of stably dissi-
pative systems.
Lemma 3.13. Given a stably dissipative matrix A, if D is a positive
diagonal matrix D such that QAD ≤ 0 then for all i = 1, . . . , n and
w ∈ Rn,
QAD(w) = 0 ⇒ aiiwi = 0 .
Proof. See [40]. 
By Theorem 3.12 the attractor ΛA,q is contained in the set {h˙ = 0}.
By the proof Proposition 3.3 we have h˙(x) = QD−1A(x− q). Hence
ΛA,q ⊆
{
x ∈ Rn+ : QD−1A(x− q) = 0
}
,
and by Lemma 3.13 it follows that ΛA,q ⊆ {x : xi = qi} for every
i = 1, . . . , n such that aii < 0.
Let us say that a species i is of type • to mean that the following
inclusion holds ΛA,q ⊆ {x : xi = qi}. Similarly, we say that a species
i is of type ⊕, to state that ΛA,q ⊆ {x : X iA,q(x) = 0}, where X iA,q(x)
stands for the i-th component of the vector XA,q(x). Equivalently, the
strategy i is of type ⊕ if and only if the sets {xi = const} are invariant
under the flow φtA,q : ΛA,q ←↩. With this terminology it can be proven
that
Proposition 3.14. Given neighbor vertexes j, l in the graph G(A),
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(a) If j is of type • or ⊕ and all of its neighbors are of type •, except
for l, then l is of type •;
(b) If j is of type • or ⊕ and all of its neighbors are of type • or
⊕, except for l, then l is of type ⊕;
(c) If all neighbors of j are of type • or ⊕, then j is of type ⊕.
Proof. See [38]. 
Based on these facts, Redheffer et al. introduced a reduction algo-
rithm on the graph G(A) to derive information on the species’ types of
a stably dissipative LV system (3.2).
Rule 1. Initially, colour black, •, every vertex i such that aii < 0, and
colour white, ◦, all other vertices.
The reduction procedure consists in applying the following rules,
corresponding to valid inference rules:
Rule 2. If j is a • or ⊕-vertex and all of its neighbours are •, except
for one vertex l, then colour l as •;
Rule 3. If j is a • or ⊕-vertex and all of its neighbours are • or ⊕,
except for one vertex l, then draw ⊕ at the vertex l;
Rule 4. If j is a ◦-vertex and all of is neighbours are • or ⊕, then
draw ⊕ at the vertex j.
Redheffer et al. define the reduced graph of the system, R(A), as the
graph obtained from G(A) by successive applications of the reduction
rules 2-4, until they can no longer be applied. An easy consequence of
this theory is the following result.
Proposition 3.15. Let A ∈ Matn(R) be a stably dissipative matrix
and consider the LV system (3.2) with an equilibrium q ∈ int(Rn+).
(1) If all vertices of R(A) are • then q is the unique globally attrac-
tive equilibrium.
(2) If R(A) has only • or ⊕ vertices then there exists an invariant
foliation with a unique globally attractive equilibrium in each
leaf.
Proof. Item (1) is clear because if all vertices are of type • then for
every orbit x(t) = (x1(t), . . . , xn(t)) of (3.2), and every i = 1, . . . , n,
one has limt→+∞ xi(t) = qi.
Likewise, if R(A) has only • or ⊕ vertices then every orbit of (3.2)
converges to an equilibrium point, which depends on the initial condi-
tion. But by Proposition 3.5 there exists an invariant foliation F with
a single equilibrium point in each leaf. Hence, the unique equilibrium
point in each leaf of F must be globally attractive. 
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Definition 3.16. We say that a dissipative matrix A ∈ Matn×n(R) is
almost skew-symmetric iff aij = −aji whenever aii = 0 or ajj = 0,
and the quadratic form QA is negative definite on the subspace
E = {w ∈ Rn : wi = 0 for all i such that aii = 0 } .
Definition 3.17. We say that the graph G(A) has a strong link (•−•)
if there is an edge {i, j} between vertexes i, j such that aii < 0 and
ajj < 0.
Proposition 3.18 (Zhao-Luo [54]). Given A ∈ Matn×n(R), A is stably
dissipative iff every cycle of G(A) contains at least a strong link and
there is a positive diagonal matrix D such that AD is almost skew-
symmetric.
Proof. See [54, Theorem 2.3], or [12, Proposition 3.5]. 
A compactification procedure introduced by J. Hofbauer [22] shows
that every Lotka-Volterra system in Rn+ is orbit equivalent to a repli-
cator system on the n-dimensional simplex ∆n. We briefly recall this
compactification. Let A be a n× n real matrix and r ∈ Rn a constant
vector. The Lotka-Volterra equation associated to A and r is defined
on Rn+ as follows
dzi
dt
= zi ( ri + (Az)i) 1 ≤ i ≤ n . (3.5)
For each j = 1, . . . , n + 1, let σj := {x ∈ ∆n ⊂ Rn+1 : xj = 0 } and
consider the diffeomorphism
φ : Rn+ → ∆n\σn+1
(z1, . . . , zn) 7→ 1
1 +
n∑
i=1
zi
(z1, . . . , zn, 1).
A straightforward calculation shows that the push-forward of the vector
field (3.5) is equal to 1
xn+1
XA˜. where XA˜ is the replicator vector field
associated to the payoff matrix
A˜ =

a11 . . . a1n r1
...
...
...
...
an1 . . . ann rn
0 . . . 0 0
 .
Since the flows of 1
xn+1
XA˜ and XA˜ are orbit equivalent, we refer to XA˜
as the compactification of the LV equation (3.5).
4. Hamiltonian Polymatrix Replicators
Definition 4.1. We say that any vector q ∈ Rn is a formal equilibrium
of a polymatrix game (n,A) if
(a) (Aq)i = (Aq)j for all i, j ∈ α, and all α = 1, . . . , p,
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(b)
∑
j∈α qj = 1 for all α = 1, . . . , p.
The matrix A induces a quadratic form QA : Hn → R defined by
QA(w) := w
T Aw, where Hn is defined in (2.2).
Definition 4.2. We call diagonal matrix of type n to any diagonal
matrix D = diag(di) such that di = dj for all i, j ∈ α and α = 1, . . . , p.
Definition 4.3. A polymatrix game (n,A) is called conservative if it
has a formal equilibrium q, and there exists a positive diagonal matrix
D of type n such that QAD = 0 on Hn.
In [3] we have defined conservative polymatrix game as follows.
Definition 4.4. A polymatrix game (n,A) is called conservative if
(a) it has a formal equilibrium,
(b) there are matrices A0, D ∈ Matn×n(R) such that
(i) (n,A) ∼ (n,A0D),
(ii) A0 is skew-symmetric,
(iii) D is a positive diagonal matrix of type n.
However, we will prove in Proposition 4.10 that these two definitions
are equivalent.
Let {e1, . . . , en} denote the canonical basis in Rn, and Vn be the set of
vertices of Γn. Each vertex v ∈ Vn can be written as v = ei1 + · · ·+ eip ,
with iα ∈ α, α = 1, . . . , p, and it determines the set
Vv := { (i, iα) : i ∈ α, i 6= iα, α = 1, . . . , p }
of cardinal n − p = dim(Hn). Notice that (i, j) ∈ Vv iff i 6= j are
in the same group and vj = 1. Hence there is a natural identification
Vv ≡ { i ∈ {1, . . . , n} : vi = 0 }. For every vertex v, the family Bv :=
{ ei − ej : (i, j) ∈ Vv } is a basis of Hn.
Lemma 4.5. For any vertex v of Γn and x, q ∈ Γn,
x− q =
∑
(i,j)∈Vv
(xi − qi) (ei − ej) .
Proof. Let v be a vertex of Γn. Notice that for all α = 1, . . . , p,
−(xiα − qiα) =
∑
i 6=iα
i∈α
(xi − qi) .
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∑
(i,j)∈Vv
(xi − qi) (ei − ej) =
p∑
α=1
∑
i 6=iα
i∈α
(xi − qi)(ei − eiα)
=
p∑
α=1
∑
i 6=iα
i∈α
(xi − qi)ei −
p∑
α=1
∑
i 6=iα
i∈α
(xi − qi)eiα
=
p∑
α=1
∑
i 6=iα
i∈α
(xi − qi)ei +
p∑
α=1
(xiα − qiα)eiα
=
p∑
α=1
∑
i∈α
(xi − qi)ei = x− q

Given ordered pairs of strategies in the same group (i, j), (k, `), i.e.,
i, j ∈ α and k, ` ∈ β for some α, β ∈ {1, . . . , p}, define
A(i,j),(k,`) := aik + aj` − ai` − ajk .
Proposition 4.6. The coefficients A(i,j),(k,`) do not depend on the rep-
resentative A of the polymatrix game (n,A).
Proof. Consider the matrix B = A − C, where the blocks Cαβ =
(cij)i∈α,j∈β of C have equal rows for all α, β = 1, . . . , p. Let (i, j) ∈ α
and (k, `) ∈ β with α, β ∈ {1, . . . , p}. Then
B(i,j),(k,`) = bik + bj` − bi` − bjk
= aik − ck + aj` − c` − ai` + c` − ajk + ck
= A(i,j),(k,`) ,
where ck is the constant entry on the kth-column of Cαβ. 
Definition 4.7. Given v ∈ Vn, we define Av ∈ Matd×d(R), d = n− p,
to be the matrix with entries A(i,j),(k,`), indexed in Vv ×Vv, and G(Av)
to be its associated graph (see Definition 3.6).
Proposition 4.8. The matrix Av represents the quadratic form
QA : Hn → R in the basis Bv.
More precisely, if q is a formal equilibrium of the polymatrix game
(n,A) then the quadratic form QA : Hn → R is given by
QA(x− q) =
∑
(i,j),(k,`)∈Vv
A(i,j),(k,`) (xi − qi) (xk − qk) . (4.1)
14 ALISHAH, DUARTE, AND PEIXE
Proof. Using lemma 4.5, we have
QA(x− q) =
 ∑
(i,j)∈Vv
(xi − qi)(ei − ej)
T A
 ∑
(k,`)∈Vv
(xk − qk)(ek − e`)

=
∑
(i,j),(k,`)∈Vv
(ei − ej)TA(ek − e`)(xi − qi)(xk − qk)
=
∑
(i,j),(k,`)∈Vv
A(i,j),(k,`)(xi − qi)(xk − qk) ,

Remark 4.9. All matrices Av, with v ∈ Vn, have the same rank be-
cause they represent, in different bases, the same (non-symmetric) bi-
linear form BA : Hn ×Hn → R, BA(v, w) := vT Aw.
Proposition 4.10. Definitions 4.3 and 4.4 are equivalent.
Proof. Given a matrix C with blocks Cαβ = (cij)i∈α,j∈β having equal
rows for all α, β = 1, . . . , p, it is clear that C(i,j),(k,`) = 0 for all pairs
of strategies (i, j), (k, `) in the same group. Hence, by Proposition 4.8,
QC vanishes on Hn.
If (n,A) is conservative in the sense of Definition 4.4 then there are
matrices: A0 skew-symmetric, and D positive diagonal of type n, such
that (n,A) ∼ (n,A0D). It follows that (n,AD−1) ∼ (n,A0) and as
observed above the matrix C = AD−1 − A0 satisfies QC = 0 on Hn.
Finally, since A0 is skew-symmetric, we have QAD−1 = 0 on Hn. In
other words, (n,A) is conservative in the sense of Definition 4.3.
Conversely, assume that A is conservative in the sense of Defini-
tion 4.3. Then for some positive diagonal matrix D of type n, QAD−1
vanishes on Hn.
Let {v1, . . . , vn} be an orthonormal basis of Rn where the vectors
vα =
1√
nα
piα(1), with α ∈ {1, . . . , p}, form a orthonormal basis of H⊥n ,
and the family {vp+1, . . . , vn} is any orthonormal basis of Hn.
Let mij = 〈AD−1vi, vj〉, for all i, j = 1, . . . , n, so that M = (mij)i,j
represents the linear endomorphism AD−1 : Rn → Rn w.r.t. the basis
{v1, . . . , vn}. Since QAD−1 = 0 on Hn, the (n− p)× (n− p) sub-matrix
M ′ of M , formed by the last n − p rows and columns of M , is skew-
symmetric.
Let M0 ∈ Matn×n(R) be a skew-symmetric matrix that shares with
M its last n− p rows. Let A0 : Rn → Rn be the linear endomorphism
represented by the matrix M0 w.r.t. the basis {v1, . . . , vn}, and iden-
tify A0 with the matrix that represents it w.r.t. the canonical basis.
Because M0 is skew-symmetric, and {v1, . . . , vn} orthonormal, A0 is
skew-symmetric too.
Then C = AD−1 − A0 is represented by the matrix M −M0 w.r.t.
the basis {v1, . . . , vn}. Since the last n − p rows of M −M0 are zero,
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the range of C : Rn → Rn is contained in H⊥n . Hence, by Lemma 2.4,
(n,AD−1) ∼ (n,A0), which implies (n,A) ∼ (n,A0D). Since A0 is
skew-symmetric, this proves that (n,A) is conservative in the sense of
Definition 4.4. 
Remark 4.11. For all w ∈ Hn, QD−1A(w) = QAD(D−1w). Hence,
because DHn = Hn for any diagonal matrix D of type n
(1) QAD(w) = 0 ∀ w ∈ Hn ⇔ QD−1A(w) = 0 ∀ w ∈ Hn.
(2) QAD(w) ≤ 0 ∀ w ∈ Hn ⇔ QD−1A(w) ≤ 0 ∀ w ∈ Hn.
Lemma 4.12. Given A ∈ Matn×n(R), if q is a formal equilibrium of
Xn,A, and D = diag(di) is a positive diagonal matrix of type n, then
the derivative of
h(x) = −
n∑
i=1
qi
di
log xi (4.2)
along the flow of Xn,A satisfies
h˙(x) = QD−1A(x− q) .
Proof.
h˙ = −
p∑
α=1
∑
i∈α
qi
di
x˙i
xi
= −
p∑
α=1
∑
i∈α
qi
di
(
(Ax)i −
p∑
β=1
(xα)tAα,βxβ
)
= −qTD−1Ax+ xTD−1Ax = (x− q)TD−1Ax
= (x− q)TD−1Ax− (x− q)TD−1Aq︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
= (x− q)TD−1A(x− q) = QD−1A(x− q) .
To explain the vanishing term notice that for all α ∈ {1, . . . , p} and
i, j ∈ α, (Aq)i = (Aq)j, di = dj and
∑
k∈α(xk − qk) = 0. 
Proposition 4.13. If A is conservative, and q and D = diag(di) are
as in Definition 4.3, then (4.2) is a first integral for the flow of Xn,A,
i.e., h˙ = 0 along the flow of Xn,A.
Moreover, Xn,A is Hamiltonian w.r.t. a stratified Poisson structure
on the prism Γn, having h as its Hamiltonian function.
Proof. The first part follows from Lemma 4.12 and Remark 4.11. The
second follows from [3, theorem 3.20]. 
5. Dissipative Polymatrix Replicators
Definition 5.1. A polymatrix game (n,A) is called dissipative if it has
a formal equilibrium q, and there exists a positive diagonal matrix D
of type n such that QAD ≤ 0 on Hn.
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Proposition 5.2. If (n,A) is dissipative, and q and D are as in Defi-
nition 5.1, then
h(x) = −
n∑
i=1
qi
di
log xi
is a Lyapunov decreasing function for the flow of Xn,A, i.e., dhdt ≤ 0
along the flow of Xn,A.
Proof. Follows from Lemma 4.12, and Remark 4.11. 
Definition 5.3. A polymatrix game (n,A) is called admissible if A
is dissipative and for some vertex v ∈ Γn the matrix Av is stably
dissipative (see Definition 3.7). We denote by V ∗n,A the subset of vertices
v ∈ Vn such that Av is stably dissipative.
Proposition 5.4. Let q be a formal equilibrium of the polymatrix game
(n,A). Given v ∈ Vn and (i, j) ∈ Vv, then we have the following
quotient rule
d
dt
(
xi
xj
)
=
xi
xj
∑
(k,`)∈Vv
A(i,j),(k,`) (xk − qk) . (5.1)
Proof. Let v be a vertex of Γn, (i, j) ∈ Vv, and q be a formal equilib-
rium. Using Lemma 4.5, we have
d
dt
(
xi
xj
)
=
xi
xj
((Ax)i − (Ax)j)
=
xi
xj
(
(A(x− q))i − (A(x− q))j
)
=
xi
xj
∑
(k,`)∈Vv
(ei − ej)TA(ek − e`)(xk − qk)
=
xi
xj
∑
(k,`)∈Vv
A(i,j),(k,`)(xk − qk) .

Proposition 5.5. If the dissipative polymatrix replicator associated
to (n,A) has an equilibrium q ∈ int (Γn), then for any state x0 ∈
int (Γn) and any pair of strategies i, j in the same group, the solution
x(t) of (2.1) with initial condition x(0) = x0 satisfies
1
c
≤ xi(t)
xj(t)
≤ c , for all t ≥ 0 ,
where c = c(x) is a constant depending on x.
Proof. Notice that the Lyapunov function h in Proposition 5.2 is a
proper function because q ∈ int(Γn). Given x0 ∈ int (Γn), h(x0) = a
for some constant a > 0. By Proposition 5.2 the compact set K =
{x ∈ int(Γn) : h(x) ≤ a} is forward invariant by the flow of Xn,A. In
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particular, the solution of the polymatrix replicator with initial condi-
tion x(0) = x0 lies in K. Hence the quotient xixj has a minimum and a
maximum in K. 
Proposition 5.6. Given a dissipative polymatrix game (n,A), if Xn,A
admits an equilibrium q ∈ int(Γn) then there exists a Xn,A-invariant
foliation F on int(Γn) such that every leaf of F contains exactly one
equilibrium point.
Proof. Fix some vertex v ∈ Vn. Recall that the entries of Av are indexed
in the set Vv ≡ { i ∈ {1, . . . , n} : vi = 0 }. Given a vector w =
(wi)i∈Vv ∈ Rn−p, we denote by w¯ the unique vector w¯ ∈ Hn such that
w¯i = wi for all i ∈ Vv.
Let E ⊂ Rn be the affine subspace of all points x ∈ Rn such that for
all α = 1, . . . , p and all i, j ∈ α, (Ax)i = (Ax)j and
∑
j∈α xj = 1. By
definition E ∩ int(Rn) is the set of interior equilibria of Xn,A. We claim
that E = {q + w¯ : w ∈ Ker(Av)}. To see this it is enough to remark
that w ∈ Ker(Av) if and only if
(Aw¯)i − (Aw¯)j = (ei − ej)TAw¯ = 0 ∀ (i, j) ∈ Vv.
Given b ∈ Ker(ATv ), consider the function gb : int(Rn+) → R defined
by gb(x) :=
∑n
j=1 b¯j log xj. The restriction of gb to Γn is invariant by
the flow of Xn,A. Note we can write
gb(x) =
n∑
l=1
b¯l log xl =
∑
(i,j)∈Vv
bi log
(
xi
xj
)
,
and differentiating gb along the flow of Xn,A, by Proposition 5.4 we get
g˙b(x) = b
T Av(xk − qk)k∈Vv = 0 for all x ∈ Γn.
Fix a basis {b1, . . . , bk} of Ker(ATv ), and define g : int(Rn+) → Rk
by g(x) := (gb1(x), . . . , gbk(x)). This map is a submersion. For that
consider the matrix B ∈ Matk×n(R) whose rows are the vectors b¯j, j =
1, . . . , k. We can write g(x) = B log x, where log x = (log x1, . . . , log xn).
Hence Dgx = BD−1x , where Dx = diag(x1, . . . , xn), and because B has
maximal rank, rank(B) = k, the map g is a submersion. Hence g deter-
mines the foliationF whose leaves are the pre-images g−1(c) = {g ≡ c}
with c ∈ Rk.
Let us now explain why each leaf of F contains exactly one point
in E . Consider the vector subspace parallel to E , E0 := {w¯ : w ∈
Ker(Av)}. Because (n,A) is dissipative, Av ∈ Matd×d(R), d = n − p,
is also dissipative, and by Proposition 3.4, Ker(Av) and Ker(ATv ) have
the same rank. Therefore dim(E0) = k. Let {c1, . . . , cn−k} be a basis of
E⊥0 ⊂ Rn and consider the matrix C ∈ Mat(n−k)×n(R) whose rows are
the vectors cj, j = 1, . . . , n − k. The matrix C provides the following
description E = {x ∈ Rn : C (x − q) = 0}. Consider the matrix U =
18 ALISHAH, DUARTE, AND PEIXE[
B
C
]
∈ Matn×n(R), which is nonsingular because by Proposition 3.4,
Ker(Av) = DKer(A
T
v ), for some positive diagonal matrix D.
The intersection g−1(c) ∩ E is described by the non-linear system
x ∈ g−1(c) ∩ E ⇔
{
B log x = c
C(x− q) = 0 .
Considering u = log x, this system becomes{
B u = c
C(eu − q) = 0 .
It is now enough to see that{
B u = c
C(eu − q) = 0 and
{
B u′ = c
C(eu
′ − q) = 0
imply u = u′. By the mean value theorem, for every i ∈ {1, . . . , n}
there is some u˜i ∈ [ui, u′i] such that
eui − eu′i = eu˜i(ui − u′i),
which in vector notation is to say that
eu − eu′ = Deu˜(u− u′) = eu˜ ∗ (u− u′).
Hence {
B (u− u′) = 0
C(eu − eu′) = 0 ⇔
{
B (u− u′) = 0
C Deu˜(u− u′) = 0
⇔
[
B
C Deu˜
]
(u− u′) = 0
⇔ U
[
I 0
0 Deu˜
]
(u− u′) = 0 .
Therefore, because
[
I 0
0 Deu˜
]
is non-singular, we must have u = u′.
Restricting F to int(Γn) we obtain a Xn,A-invariant foliation on
int(Γn). Notice that the restriction g|int(Γn) : int(Γn)→ Rk is invariant
by the flow of Xn,A because all its components are.
Since all points in int(Γn)∩E are equilibria, each leaf of the restricted
foliation contains exactly one equilibrium point. 
Definition 5.7. We call attractor of the polymatrix replicator (2.1) to
the following topological closure
Λn,A := ∪x∈Γnω(x) ,
where ω(x) is the ω-limit of x by the flow {ϕtn,A : Γn → Γn}t∈R.
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Proposition 5.8. Given a dissipative polymatrix replicator associated
to (n,A) with an equilibrium q ∈ int (Γn) and a diagonal matrix D as
in Definition 4.3, we have that
Λn,A ⊆ {x ∈ Γn : QD−1A(x− q) = 0 } .
Proof. By Theorem 3.12 the attractor Λn,A is contained in the region
where h˙ = 0. The conclusion follows then by Lemma 4.12. 
Given an admissible polymatrix replicator associated to (n,A) with
an equilibrium q ∈ int (Γn), we say that a strategy i is of type • to
mean that the following inclusion holds Λn,A ⊆ {x ∈ Γn : xi = qi}.
Similarly, we say that a strategy i is of type ⊕ to state that Λn,A ⊆
{x ∈ Γn : X in,A(x) = 0}, where X in,A(x) stands for the i-th component
of the vector Xn,A(x). Given two strategies i and j in the same group,
we say that i and j are related when the orbits on the attractor Λn,A
preserve the foliation { xi
xj
= const. }.
For any v ∈ Vn we will denote by avij the entries of the matrix Av.
With this terminology we have
Proposition 5.9. Given an admissible polymatrix game (n,A) with an
equilibrium q ∈ int (Γn) the following statements hold:
(1) For any graph G(Av) with v ∈ V ∗n,A:
(a) if i is a strategy such that vi = 0 and avii < 0, then i is of
type •;
(b) if j is a strategy of type • or ⊕ and all neighbours of j but
` in G(Av) are of type •, then ` is of type •;
(c) if j is a strategy of type • or ⊕ and all neighbours of j but
` in G(Av) are of type • or ⊕, then ` is of type ⊕;
(2) For any graph G(Av) with v ∈ Vn:
(d) if all neighbours of a strategy j in G(Av) are of type • or
⊕, then j is related to the unique strategy j′, in the same
group as j, such that vj′ = 1.
Proof. The proof involves the manipulation of algebraic relations hold-
ing on the attractor. To simplify the terminology we will say that some
algebraic relation holds to mean that it holds on the attractor.
Choose a positive diagonal matrix D of type n such that QAD ≤ 0 on
Hn, and set A˜ := D−1A. By Lemma 3.8, for any v ∈ Vn, the matrices
Av and A˜v have the same dissipative and stably dissipative character.
Hence V ∗n,A = V ∗n,A˜.
Given v ∈ V ∗n,A, for any solution x(t) of the polymatrix replicator in
the attractor, we have that QA˜v (x(t)− q) = 0. Hence, as A˜v is stably
dissipative and avii < 0, by Lemma 3.13 follows that xi(t) = qi on the
attractor, which proves (a).
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Given v ∈ V ∗n,A we have that A˜v is stably dissipative. By Proposi-
tion 5.8, we obtain ∑
(k,`)∈Vv
A˜(j,j′),(k,`)(xk − qk) = 0
on the attractor.
Observe that if j is of type •, then xj = qj, and if j is of type ⊕,
then avjj = A(j,j′),(j,j′) = 0, where j′ is the unique strategy in the same
group as j such that vj′ = 1.
Let j, ` be neighbour vertices in the graph G(Av).
Let us prove (b). If j is of type • or ⊕ and all of its neighbours are
of type •, except for `, then
A˜(j,j′),(`,`′)(x` − q`) = 0 ,
from which follows that x` = q` because A(j,j′),(`,`′) = djA˜(j,j′),(`,`′) 6= 0 ,
where `′ is the unique strategy in the same group as ` such that v`′ = 1.
This proves (b).
Let us prove (c). If j is of type • or ⊕ and all of its neighbours are
of type • or ⊕, except for `, then
A(j,j′),(`,`′)(x` − q`) = c ,
for some constant c. Hence because A(j,j′),(`,`′) 6= 0, x` is constant which
proves (c).
Let us prove (d). Suppose all neighbours of a strategy j are of type
• or ⊕. By the polymatrix quotient rule (see Proposition 5.4),
d
dt
(
xj
xj′
)
=
xj
xj′
∑
(k,`)∈Vv
A(j,j′),(k,`) (xk − qk) .
Since all neighbours of j are of type • or ⊕ we obtain
d
dt
(
xj
xj′
)
=
xj
xj′
C ,
for some constant C. Hence
xj
xj′
= B0 e
Ct ,
where B0 =
xj(0)
xj′ (0)
. By Proposition 5.5 we have that the constant C
must be 0. Hence there exists a constant B0 > 0 such that
xj
xj′
= B0,
which proves (d). 
Proposition 5.10. If in a group α all strategies are of type • (re-
spectively of type • or ⊕) except for one strategy i, then i is of type •
(respectively of type ⊕).
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Proof. Suppose that in a group α all strategies are of type • or ⊕ except
for one strategy i. We have that xk = ck, for some constant ck, for each
k 6= i. Thus,
xi = 1−
∑
j∈α
j 6=i
xj = 1−
∑
j=•
xj −
∑
k=⊕
xk = 1−
∑
j=•
qj −
∑
k=⊕
ck .
Hence i is of type ⊕.
If in a group α all strategies are of type •, the proof is analogous. 
Proposition 5.11. Assume that in a group α with n strategies, n−k of
them, with 0 ≤ k < n, are of type • or ⊕, and denote by S the set of the
remaining k strategies. If the graph with vertex set S, obtained drawing
an edge between every pair of related strategies in S, is connected, then
all strategies in S are of type ⊕.
Proof. Since all strategies in α\S are of type • or ⊕, for the strategies
in S we have that ∑
i∈S
xi = 1− C , (5.2)
where C =
∑
j∈α\S xj.
Let GS be the graph with vertex set S obtained drawing an edge
between every pair of related strategies in S. Since GS is connected we
have that it contains a tree. Considering the k−1 relations between the
strategies in S given by that tree, we have k − 1 linearly independent
equations of the form xi = Cijxj for pairs of strategies i and j in
S, where Cij is a constant. Together with (5.2) we obtain k linear
independent equations for the k strategies in S, which implies that
xi = constant, for every i ∈ S. This concludes the proof. 
Based on these facts we introduce a reduction algorithm on the set
of graphs {G(Av) : v ∈ Vn } to derive information on the strategies of
an admissible polymatrix game (n,A).
In each step, we also register the information obtained about each
strategy in what we call the “information set”, where all strategies of
the polymatrix are represented.
The algorithm is about labelling (or colouring) strategies with the
“colours” • and ⊕. The algorithm acts upon all graphs G(Av) with
v ∈ Vn as well as on the information set. It is implicit that after each
rule application, the new labels (or colours) are transferred between the
graphs G(Av) and the information set, that is, if in a graph G(Av) a
strategy i has been coloured i = •, then in all other graphs containing
the strategy i, we colour it i = •, as well on the information set.
Some rules just can be applied to graphs G(Av) such that v ∈ V ∗n,A,
while others can be applied to all graphs.
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Rule 1. Initially, for each graph G(Av) such that v ∈ V ∗n,A colour in
black (•) any strategy i such that avii < 0. Colour in white (◦) all other
strategies.
The reduction procedure consists in applying the following rules,
corresponding to valid inferences rules. For each graph G(Av) such
that v ∈ V ∗n,A:
Rule 2. If i has colour • or ⊕ and all neighbours of i but j in G(Av)
are •, then colour j = •.
Rule 3. If i has colour • or ⊕ and all neighbours of i but j in G(Av)
are • or ⊕, then colour j = ⊕.
For each graph G(Av) such that v ∈ Vn:
Rule 4. If i has colour ◦ and all neighbours of i in G(Av) are • or ⊕,
then we put a link between strategies j and j′ in the “information set”,
where j′ is the unique strategy such that vj′ = 1 and j′ is in the same
group as j.
The following rules can be applied to the set of all strategies of the
polymatrix game.
Rule 5. If in a group all strategies have colour • (respectively, •,⊕)
except for one strategy i, then colour i = • (respectively, i = ⊕).
Rule 6. If in a group some strategies have colour • or ⊕, and the
remaining strategies are related forming a connected graph, then colour
with ⊕ all that remaining strategies.
We define the reduced information setR(n,A) as the {•,⊕, ◦}-coloring
on the set of strategies {1, . . . , n}, which is obtained by successive ap-
plications to the graphs G(Av), v ∈ Vn, of the reduction rules 1-6, until
they can no longer be applied.
Proposition 5.12. Let (n,A) be an admissible polymatrix game, and
consider the associated polymatrix replicator (2.1) with an interior equi-
librium q ∈ int(Γn).
(1) If all vertices of R(n,A) are • then q is the unique globally
attractive equilibrium.
(2) IfR(n,A) has only • or ⊕ vertices then there exists an invariant
foliation with a unique globally attractive equilibrium in each
leaf.
Proof. Item (1) is clear because if all strategies are of type • then for
every orbit x(t) = (x1(t), . . . , xn(t)) of (2.1), and every i = 1, . . . , n,
one has limt→+∞ xi(t) = qi.
Likewise, if R(n,A) has only • or ⊕ vertices then every orbit of
(2.1) converges to an equilibrium point, which depends on the initial
condition. But by Proposition 5.6 there exists an invariant foliation
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F with a single equilibrium point in each leaf. Hence, the unique
equilibrium point in each leaf of F must be globally attractive. 
The following definition corresponds to a one-step reduction of the
attractor dynamics.
Definition 5.13. Given a polymatrix game (n,A), a strategy ` ∈ α, for
some group α, and a point q ∈ int (Γn), we call (q, `)-reduction of (n,A)
to a new polymatrix game (n(`), A(`)) obtained removing the strategy
` from the group α, where n(`) := (n1, . . . , nα−1, nα − 1, nα+1, . . . , np),
and the matrix A(`) = (aij(`)) indexed in {1, . . . , ` − 1, ` + 1, . . . , n}
has the following entries:
aij(`) :=
{
aij − alj if j /∈ α
(aij − alj)(1− q`) + (ail − all)q` if j ∈ α \ {`} . (5.3)
The map ψ` : Γn ∩ {x` = q`} → Γn(`), ψ`(x) = xˇ` = (xj)j 6=`, defines
a natural identification.
Proposition 5.14. Let (n,A) be a polymatrix game with an equilibrium
q ∈ int (Γn). Given a strategy ` ∈ α, for some group α, the (q, `)-
reduction (n(`), A(`)) of (n,A) is such that if x ∈ Γn ∩ {x` = q`} and
Xn,A(x) is tangent to {x` = q`}, that is X`n,A(x) = 0, then for all j 6= `,
Xjn,A(x) = X
j
n(`),A(`)(xˇ
`) .
Proof. Suppose that for some α ∈ {1, . . . , p} there exists ` ∈ α such
that x ∈ Γn ∩ {x` = q`} and X`n,A(x) = 0.
Since
∑
j∈α
j 6=`
xj = 1− q`, considering the change of variables
yj =
{ xj
1−q` if j ∈ α \ {`}
xj if j /∈ α , (5.4)
we have that
∑
j∈α\{`} yj = 1 .
By Proposition 2.5, we can assume A = (aij) has all entries equal to
zero in row `, i.e., alj = 0 for all j. Thus we obtain
dx`
dt
= x`
(
−
p∑
β=1
(xα)tAαβxβ
)
.
Hence, making x` = q`, the replicator equation (2.1) becomes
(i) if i ∈ α \ {`},
dxi
dt
= xi
 n∑
j=1
j 6=`
aijxj + ailq` −
∑
k∈α
k 6=`
n∑
j=1
akjxkxj
 (5.5)
(ii) if i ∈ β 6= α, the equation is essentially the same, with x` = q`.
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Observe that
∑p
β=1(x
α)tAαβxβ = 0 because we are assuming that
x ∈ Γn ∩ {x` = q`} and X`n,A(x) = 0.
Hence we can add
− q`
1− q`
p∑
β=1
(xα)tAαβxβ
to each equation for dxi
dt
, with i ∈ α \ {`}, without changing the vector
field Xn,A at the points x ∈ Γn ∩ {x` = q`} where Xn,A(x) is tangent
to {x` = q`}. So equation (5.5) becomes
dxi
dt
= xi
 n∑
j=1
j 6=`
aijxj + ailq` − 1
1− q`
∑
k∈α
k 6=`
n∑
j=1
akjxkxj
 (5.6)
Now, using the change of variables (5.4), equation (5.6) becomes
dyi
dt
= yi
fi −∑
k∈α
k 6=`
ykfk
 (i ∈ α) , (5.7)
where fi =
∑
j∈α\{`} aij(1− q`)yj + ailq` +
∑
j /∈α aijyj.
Let αˇ ≡ α \ {`}. Setting ailq` = ailq`(
∑
j∈αˇ yj),
dyi
dt
= yi
(
gi −
∑
k∈β
ykgk
)
, i ∈ β, β ∈ {1, . . . , p} , (5.8)
where gi =
∑
j∈αˇ(aij(1 − q`) + ailq`)yj +
∑
j /∈αˇ aijyj, defines a new
polymatrix game in dimension n − 1. In fact, (5.8) is the replicator
equation of the polymatrix game (n(`), A(`)), where, since we have
assumed that alj = 0 for all j, (5.3) becomes
aij(`) =
{
aij if j /∈ αˇ
aij(1− q`) + ailq` if j ∈ αˇ .

Remark 5.15. Under the assumptions of Proposition 5.14, when nα =
2, considering for instance that the group α consists of strategies `− 1
and `, x` = q` implies that x`−1 = 1 − q` = q`−1. Hence we can
further reduce the polymatrix game (n(`), A(`)) to a new polymatrix
game with type (n1, . . . , nα−1, nα+1, . . . , np) and payoff matrix indexed
in {1, . . . , `− 2, `+ 1, . . . , n}.
Corollary 5.16. Let (n,A) be a polymatrix game with an equilibrium
q ∈ int (Γn). Given a set Q ⊂ {1, . . . , n} of strategies such that
Λn,A ⊆
⋂
`∈Q
{x` = q`} ,
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then there exists a new polymatrix game (m,B), where mα = |α \Q| for
every α = 1, . . . , p, and an identification ψ : Γn ∩
⋂
`∈Q{x` = q`} → Γm
such that Xn,A = Xm,B ◦ ψ on the attractor Λn,A.
In other words, the attractor Λn,A lives on a lower dimension poly-
matrix replicator of type m.
Proof. Apply Proposition 5.14 repeatedly. 
Lemma 5.17. Given a polymatrix game (n,A) and a diagonal matrix
D of type n, we have
(AD)v = AvDv ,
where Av is given in Definition 4.7 and Dv is the submatrix of D in-
dexed in Vv = { i ∈ {1, . . . , n} : vi = 0 }.
Proof. Given indices i, k ∈ Vv, take j, resp. `, in the group of i, resp.
k, such that vj = v` = 1.
Since D is of type n we have dk = d`. By Definition 4.7,
((AD)v)ik = (AD)(i,j),(k,`) = aikdk + aj`d` − ai`d` − ajkdk
= (aik + aj` − ai` − ajk) dk
= A(i,j),(k,`) dk = (AvDv)ik .

Lemma 5.18. Let (n,A) be an admissible polymatrix game and D a
diagonal matrix as in Definition 5.1. Given v ∈ V ∗n,A such that v` = 0
and avll < 0 for some ` ∈ α with α ∈ {1, . . . , p}, there exists a positive
diagonal matrix Dˇ of type n(`) such that (A(`)Dˇ)vˇ is the submatrix of
(AD)v obtained eliminating row and column `. Moreover
(a) (n(`), A(`)) is admissible, and;
(b) vˇ ∈ V ∗n(`),A(`).
Proof. By Proposition 2.5, we can assume A = (aij) has all entries
equal to zero in row `, i.e., alj = 0 for all j.
Since (n,A) is admissible and v ∈ V ∗n,A, (AD)v is stably dissipative.
Consider the set I = {i ∈ {1, . . . , n} : vi = 0 and avii = 0 }. By
Proposition 3.18, the submatrix Bv = (avij dj)i,j∈I of (AD)v = AvDv is
skew-symmetric.
Let Γn(`) be the polytope corresponding to the new polymatrix repli-
cator in lower dimension, given by Proposition 5.14 and defined by
matrix A(`) = (aij(`))i,j 6=`.
Observing that vi = 0 for all strategies i of the matrix (AD)v, we
can choose the vertex vˇ in the polytope Γn(`) determined by the exact
same strategies as v. Notice that v` = 0 for the removed strategy `.
As in the proof of Proposition 5.14 the matrix A(`) is defined by
aij(`) =
{
aij if j /∈ αˇ
aij(1− q`) + ailq` if j ∈ αˇ .
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Hence
avˇij(`) =
{
avij if j /∈ αˇ
(1− q`)avij if j ∈ αˇ ,
where avˇij(`) ≡ (aij(`))vˇ are the entries of matrix A(`)vˇ.
Considering the positive diagonal matrix
Dˇ = diag
(
I1, . . . ,
1
1− q` Iα, . . . , Ip
)
,
we have that (A(`)Dˇ)vˇ is the submatrix Bv of (AD)v obtained by re-
moving the row and column corresponding to strategy `. By Lemma 5.17,
(A(`)Dˇ)vˇ = A(`)vˇ Dˇvˇ. Hence, by Lemma 3.10, A(`)vˇ Dˇvˇ is stably dis-
sipative, and consequently, by Lemma 3.8, A(`)vˇ is also stably dissipa-
tive. 
Proposition 5.14 and Lemma 5.18 allows us to generalize [11, The-
orem 4.5] about the Hamiltonian nature of the limit dynamics in ad-
missible polymatrix replicators.
Theorem 5.19. Consider a polymatrix replicator (2.1) on Γn, and as-
sume that the system is admissible and has an equilibrium q ∈ int (Γn).
Then the limit dynamics of (2.1) on the attractor Λn,A is described by
a Hamiltonian polymatrix replicator in some lower dimensional prism
Γn′.
Proof. By definition there exists a vertex v ∈ Γn such that Av = (avij)
is stably dissipative. Applying Proposition 5.14 and Lemma 5.18 we
obtain a new polymatrix replicator in lower dimension that is admissi-
ble.
We can iterate this process until the corresponding vertex vˇ in the
polytope is such that, avˇii = 0 for all i with vˇi = 0.
Let us denote the resulting polymatrix game by (r, A′). By Propo-
sition 3.18, for some positive diagonal matrix D′ of type r, (A′D′)vˇ
is skew-symmetric. Hence QA′D′ = 0 on Hr, and by Definition 4.3
the polymatrix game (r, A′) is conservative. Notice that this polyma-
trix game has essentially the same formal equilibrium up to coordinate
rescalings. Thus by Proposition 4.13 the vector field Xr,A′ is Hamil-
tonian. 
6. An Example
Consider the polymatrix replicator system associated to the polyma-
trix game G = ((3, 2), A), where
A =

−1 8 −7 3 −3
−10 −1 11 3 −3
11 −7 −4 −6 6
−3 −3 6 0 0
3 3 −6 0 0
 .
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We denote by XG the vector field associated to this polymatrix repli-
cator defined on the popytope Γ(3,2) = ∆2 ×∆1 .
Figure 1. Four orbits in two different leafs of the polymatrix
game G.
In this example we want to illustrate the reduction algorithm on
the set of graphs {G(Av) : v ∈ V(3,2) } to derive information on the
strategies of the polymatrix game G as described in section 5. We will
see that this polymatrix game is admissible and verify the validity of
the conclusion of Theorem 5.19 for this example.
v1 = (1, 4) v2 = (1, 5) v3 = (2, 4) v4 = (2, 5) v5 = (3, 4) v6 = (3, 5)
Table 1. Vertex labels.
In this game the strategies are divided in two groups, {1, 2, 3} and
{4, 5}. The vertices of the phase space Γ(3,2) will be designated by
pairs in {1, 2, 3} × {4, 5}, where the label (i, j) stands for the point
ei+ej ∈ Γ(3,2). To simplify the notation we designate the prism vertices
by the letters v1, . . . , v6 according to table 1.
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Vertex Av G(Av)
v1 ∈ V ∗n,A
 0 27 0−27 −9 18
0 −18 0

v2 ∈ V ∗n,A
 0 27 0−27 −9 −18
0 18 0

v3 ∈ V ∗n,A
 0 −27 027 −9 18
0 −18 0

v4 ∈ V ∗n,A
 0 −27 027 −9 −18
0 18 0

v5 /∈ V ∗n,A
 −9 18 −18−36 −9 −18
18 18 0

v6 /∈ V ∗n,A
 −9 18 18−36 −9 18
−18 −18 0

Table 2. Matrix Av and its graph G(Av) for each vertex v.
The point q ∈ int (Γ(3,2)) given by
q =
(
1
3
,
1
3
,
1
3
,
1
2
,
1
2
)
,
is an equilibrium of our polymatrix replicator XG. In particular it is
also a formal equilibrium of G (see Definition 4.1).
The quadratic form QA : H(3,2) → R induced by matrix A is
QA(x) = −9x23 ,
where x = (x1, x2, x3, x4, x5) ∈ H(3,2). By Definition 5.1, G is dissipa-
tive.
In table 2 we present for each vertex v in the prism the corresponding
matrix Av and graph G(Av).
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Step Rule Vertex Strategy Group 1 Group 2
1 1 v1, v2, v3, v4 3
2 4 v4 (or v5) 4, 5
3 6 − 4, 5
4 3 v1, v2 1, 2
Table 3. Information set of all strategies (by group) of G, where
for each step, we mention the rule, the vertex (or vertices) and the
strategy (or strategies) to which we apply the rule.
Considering vertex v1 = (1, 4) for instance, by Proposition 3.18, we
have that matrix Av1 is stably dissipative. Hence, by Definition 5.3, G
is admissible and v1 ∈ V ∗n,A.
Table 3 represents the steps of the reduction procedure applied to G.
Let us describe it step by step:
(Step 1) Initially, considering the vertices v1, v2, v3 and v4 we apply rule 1
to the corresponding graphsG(Av1), G(Av2), G(Av3) andG(Av4),
and we colour in black (•) strategy 3. We obtain the graphs
depicted in column “Step 1” in table 4;
(Step 2) In this step we can consider vertex v4 (or v5) to apply rule 4.
Hence, we put a link between strategies 4 and 5 in group 2;
(Step 3) In this step we apply rule 6 to strategies 4 and 5, and we colour
with ⊕ that strategies. We obtain the graphs depicted in col-
umn “Step 3” in table 4;
(Step 4) Finally, we apply rule 3 to vertices v2 and v3 in the correspond-
ing graphs of the column “Step 3” in table 4, and we colour with
⊕ the strategy 2. Analogously we apply rule 3 to vertices v1
and v3 in the corresponding graphs of the column “Step 3” in
table 4, and we colour with ⊕ the strategy 1. We obtain the
graphs depicted in column “Step 4” table 4.
Since G is admissible and has an equilibrium q ∈ int (Γ(3,2)), by
Theorem 5.19 we have that its limit dynamics on the attractor ΛG is
described by a Hamiltonian polymatrix replicator in a lower dimen-
sional prism. Considering the strategy 3 in group 1, by Definition 5.13
we obtain the (q, 3)-reduction ((2, 2), A(3)) where A˜ := A(3) is the
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Vertex Step 1 Step 3 Step 4
Table 4. The graphs obtained in each step of the reduction
algorithm for G.
matrix
A˜ =

−9 9 9 −9
−9 9 9 −9
−6 6 6 −6
−6 6 6 −6
 .
Consider now the polymatrix replicator associated to the game
G˜ =
(
(2, 2), A˜
)
, which is equivalent to the trivial game ((2, 2), 0).
Hence its replicator dynamics on the polytope Γ(2,2) = ∆1 × ∆1 is
trivial, in the sense that all points are equilibria. In particular the
associated vector field XG˜ = 0 is Hamiltonian.
Since the reduced information set R(G) is of type {•,⊕}, by Propo-
sition 5.12 the flow of XG admits an invariant foliation with a single
globally attractive equilibrium on each leaf (see Figure 1). Therefore,
the attractor ΛG is just a line segment of equilibria, which embeds in
the Hamitonian flow of XG˜ = 0, as asserted by Proposition 5.14.
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